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Abstract
A potentially dangerous product is supplied by a competitive market. The likeli-
hood of a product-related accident depends on the unobservable precautions taken by
the manufacturer and on the type of the consumer. Contracts include the price to be
paid by the consumer ex ante and stipulated damages to be paid by the manufacturer
ex post in the event of an accident. Although the stipulated damage payments are a
potential solution to the moral hazard problem, firms have a private incentive to reduce
the stipulated damages (and simultaneously lower the up front price) in order to attract
the safer consumers who are less costly to serve. The competitive equilibrium–if an
equilibrium exists at all–features suboptimally low stipulated damages and correspond-
ingly suboptimal levels of product safety. Imposing tort liability on manufacturers for
uncovered accident losses–and prohibiting private parties from waiving that liability–
can improve social welfare.
1 Introduction
In the summer of 1980, Joseph Mullan was injured when his home-built airplane crashed
on the runway at the Loveland-Fort Collins, Colorado airport. Mr. Mullan sued Quickie
Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer and distributor of the kit from which he had built
the plane.1 A central issue in the case was a waiver-of-liability clause in the kit’s sales
∗The authors thank Jim Dana, Steve Shavell, Abe Wickelgren, and 2010 summer workshop participants
at University of Virginia Law School for many helpful comments and suggestions. Comments are welcome
to ahc4p@virginia.edu or kspier@law.harvard.edu.
1Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp., 797 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1986).
1
contract, a clause intended to insulate Quickie from liability for future damages.2 A lower
court deemed the clause to be unconscionable, and the jury subsequently found Quickie
liable for $155,000 in damages. Quickie appealed the lower court’s decision, contending
that the waiver-of-liability clause was, in fact, a valid agreement between sophisticated
parties. Mr. Mullan was no novice: he was an FAA certified pilot and had commercial
experience making airplane propellers. Moreover, Mr. Mullan had been actively involved
in the drafting of the sales contract, modifying and fine-tuning the contractual clauses
originally proposed by Quickie. The Tenth Circuit court found that Mullan had indeed
had a reasonable opportunity to read and understand the waiver-of-liability clause in the
sales contract, and the case was subsequently remanded to the district court for further
consideration.3 The question of whether consumers like Mr. Mullan should be permitted
to waive products liability remained unanswered.4
Should manufacturers and sophisticated consumers be free to design their own liability
schemes for defective products? This paper argues that the answer may be “No.” Free
markets–even those involving fully rational consumers–may fail to operate eﬃciently when
product safety is not directly observed by consumers at the time of purchase. Manufacturers
certainly do have private incentives to issue warranties, stipulated damage provisions, and
product-specific insurance policies in order to signal the safety of their products. Distortions
emerge, however, when consumers vary in their likelihood of suﬀering harm and the market
cannot engage in first-degree price discrimination. In order to obtain lower prices for the
products they buy, rational low-risk consumers may be willing to waive their rights to be
compensated ex post. They would do this knowing full well that the lack of manufacturer
accountability will compromise the safety of the products that they consume.
Formally, we consider a model where a potentially dangerous product is supplied by a
competitive market. There is a moral hazard problem in the sense that the likelihood of a
product-related accident depends, in part, on the unobservable safety precautions taken by
2Specifically, the contract provided that “Quickie Aircraft Corporation is not responsible, and makes no
warranties, express or implied whatsoever, regarding the structural integrity, performance, flight character-
istics, or safety of the Buyer’s completed air craft and its component parts....Buyer expressly waives any and
all claims arising from structural integrity, performance, flight characteristics, mechanical failures, and risks
of flying a home-built aircraft.” Mullan, 797 F.2d at 848. These clauses are also referred to as exculpa-
tory clauses, exclusion clauses, assumption-of-risk clauses, hold-harmless clauses, and limitation-of-liability
clauses.
3The court states: “[g]iven Mullan’s expertise with respect to airplanes, his ability with woodworking,
his awareness of the recreational nature of a home-built aircraft, his thorough investigation of the Quickie
aircraft prior to ordering it, his modification of the sales agreement, coupled with all of the circumstances
surrounding the formation of the contract, we do not view the disclaimer provision as unconscionable.”
Mullan, 797 F.2d at 852.
4On the question of whether exculpatory clauses should be upheld, the court relied on Colorado Supreme
Court’s decision of Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981). In that case, the Supreme Court identified
four factors that must be considered: “(1) the existence of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service
performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is
expressed in clear and unambiguous language.” Id. at 376. The Mullan court stated that “Quickie did not
owe a duty to the public....” Mullan, 797 F.2d at 853.
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manufacturers. There is also an adverse selection problem in the sense that some consumers
are intrinsically more accident prone than others, and consumers are privately informed
about their probability of being harmed. Manufacturers compete for consumers by oﬀering
contracts that specify (1) the price to be paid by the consumer to the manufacturer up
front, and (2) stipulated damages to be paid by the manufacturer to the consumer ex post
in the event of an accident.
We show that the unregulated private market will under-supply product safety. If
the stipulated damages fully covered the losses to consumers, the manufacturers would
have an incentive to choose socially optimal precautions. But when fully insured against
future losses, consumers would disregard their own risk types when making their purchase
decisions. They would buy on the basis of price alone and would be pooled together from
the perspective of the manufacturers. Low-risk consumers, who are cheaper to serve, would
eﬀectively subsidize their high-risk counterparts. In this environment, firms would have an
incentive to reduce the stipulated damages and lower the up front price in order to attract
only the low-risk consumers. Because of this adverse selection problem, the competitive
equilibrium–if an equilibrium exists at all–features suboptimally low stipulated damages
and correspondingly suboptimal levels of product safety.5 We show that imposing tort
liability on manufacturers for uncovered accident losses–and prohibiting private parties
from waiving that liability–improves social welfare.
Currently, in the United States, both the tort and contract laws are hostile towards
private contractual limitations of liability. Under the products liability law, when a con-
sumer suﬀers injury from a “defective” product,6 notwithstanding any contractual waiver,
the consumer can still bring a liability claim against the manufacturer. The Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability §18 (1998) states that “[d]isclaimers and limitations
of remedies by product sellers or other distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and
other similar contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid
products liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to
persons.”7 The contract law is similarly hostile towards manufacturers limiting liability
5The basic structure of our argument is similar to Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) analysis of insurance
markets. In their model, the need for insurance is driven by the risk aversion of consumers. In our
model consumers are risk neutral, but liability is necessary to create incentives for the manufacturers to take
precautions. Our model also has the added complexity that the social planner would like to discourage
the highest risk consumers from purchasing the product at all. As a result, the optimal social policy may
involve less-than-full coverage for accident losses. See also Riley (1976) and Wilson (1977).
6A defect can stem from three possible sources: design, manufacturing, or warning. As a rough generaliza-
tion, while manufacturing defects are said to impose strict (or even absolute) liability on the manufacturer–
plaintiﬀ only needs to show that the product did not conform to the defendant’s specifications not whether
the defendant was negligent in production, design and warning defects require a proof of manufacturer’s
negligence or fault. See Schwartz (1988), Priest (1991), and Abraham (1997).
7The seminal case that supports this rule is Henningsen v.Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960). In that case, plaintiﬀ was injured when the steering wheel of a new Plymouth failed. Even
though the contract contained a disclaimer of liability for personal injury, the court invalidated the clause.
An exception to this principle is in negligence law, where waivers of liability are commonly upheld. In cases
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for personal (“non-commercial”) injury.8 The Uniform Commercial Code §2-719(3) states
that “[l]imitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial
is not.”
While the case for imposing tort liability on manufacturers for the harms caused to
bystanders and other non-contractual victims is well-established in the theoretical law and
economics literature, the case for extending tort liability to the harms borne by consumers
(and other contractual victims) is considerably weaker.9 Manufacturer liability would be
unnecessary when the safety of the product is easily observed (and well understood) by
consumers at the time of sale, since consumers would demand cost-justified improvements
in product safety and would be willing to pay a premium for them (Hamada, 1976).10 Man-
ufacturer liability may be socially desirable when consumers systematically underestimate
product risks; without it, the market will tend to under-provide safety. This argument
was first made by Spence (1977), and has been advanced by many others.11 Manufacturer
liability may also be desirable when the safety of products is not readily observable to con-
sumers at the time of sale, since liability provides incentives for better product design.12
However, in order to use this argument to justify products liability laws, one must first
explain the failure of market participants to find private solutions to moral hazard and
involving recreational activities such as sky diving, bungee jumping, and snowmobiling, providers of these
activities may successfully avoid liability for consumer harms. See Ausness (2000).
8The US Supreme Court, in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858
(1986), stated that when injury is commercial, aﬀecting only the product, the issue of liability is left to the
law of contracts.
9Polinsky and Shavell (2010) argue that, at least with respect to products that are sold widely in the
market, market forces are strong as to provide the manufacturers with better deterrence incentive than the
current, costly product liability system. Many legal scholars have emphasized that allowing manufacturers
and consumers to design their own liability schemes, through contract, will enhance social welfare by allowing
them to shift product-related risks to those who can bear them at a lower cost. See Ausness (2000), Schwartz
(1988), and Priest (1981, 1991).
10Oi (1973) showed that products liability could lead to strictly worse market outcomes if consumers were
heterogeneous in the value that the value that they placed on product safety and price discrimination was
impossible. By forcing complete coverage of consumer losses, manufacturers lose the ability to screen among
consumers and fine-tune product safety to a particular consumer’s needs.
11See also Epple and Raviv (1978); Polinsky and Rogerson (1983); Geistfeld (1995); Schwartz (1988, 1992).
In our model, even though consumers correctly perceive product safety, due to the problems of adverse
selection, low-risk consumers have an incentive to accept suboptimal warranty and lower price, which, in
turn, produces suboptimal deterrence incentive to the manfuacturers. Absent consumer misperceptions
of risk, products liability may also be desirable when consumers cause harm to bystanders when using the
products, and the consumers are themselves judgment proof (Hay and Spier, 2005). Related work on
vicarious liability includes Sykes (1998) and Dari Mattiacci and Parisi (2002).
12Absent financial incentives, manufacturers would be tempted to chisel quality to save money and would
decline to disclose product defects to consumers. Daughety and Reinganum (1995) argue that liability fa-
cilitates the signaling of product quality through the prices charged by manufacturers. They also suggest
that welfare could be further improved through the regulation of safety standards. Daughety and Rein-
ganum (1997) formally model penalties for lying about product safety and quality. See also Daughety and
Reinganum (2008). None of these papers consider product warranties or private contractual solutions.
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adverse selection problems.13 In order to establish the social value of tort liability, it is
therefore crucial to understand why private contracts for dangerous products may fail to
operate eﬃciently.
There is a small literature arguing that private contracts between sophisticated parties
may not lead to eﬃcient levels of product safety.14 In an adverse-selection model with
heterogeneous, risk-averse consumers, Ordover (1979) argues that products liability can
help overcome the ineﬃciencies of private insurance markets. He assumes that product
safety is observable to consumers at the time of sale, and does not consider the problem
of manufacturer moral hazard. Also, in contrast to our results, due to the failure of
the insurance market, the product market, in equilibrium, will provide excessively safe
products.15 Wickelgren (2009) argues that the failure of private contracting stems from
the transactions costs of using the legal system to resolve tort disputes. Because of the ex
post costs of using the legal system to compensate victims of accidents, consumers will have
a private incentive to waive liability in exchange for a lower purchase price, not internalizing
the negative implications for ex ante safety design. In his setting, mandating liability is a
commitment device that induces higher (and more eﬃcient) ex ante investments in product
safety.16 Arlen and MacLeod (2003) apply a similar logic to waivers of liability for medical
malpractice.17
The economics literature has proposed a number of diﬀerent rationales for product
warranties but has largely side-stepped the normative issues surrounding their use (namely
the optimal scope for policy interventions such as tort liability).18 Warranties can solve
13Note that tort liability may also be desirable when the transactions costs associated with the drafting of
private contracts is prohibitively high. See Schwartz (1988). Even absent private contracts and warranties,
however, liability may be unnecessary in dynamic settings if manufactures can credibly establish reputations
for high quality. See Klein and Leﬄer (1981).
14There is also a small literature arguing that privately stipulated damages can be used by incumbent
monopolists for anticompetitive purposes. See Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Spier and Whinston (1995).
In these models, the stipulated damages are excessive rather than being insuﬃcient.
15Rather than serving the function of encouraging greater investments by the manufacturer in product
safety, products liability helps to mitigate the social losses associated with consumer risk aversion. As in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Ordover shows that a competitive equilibrium for insurance either does not
exist or, when it does, consumers purchase incomplete insurance coverage.
16Wickelgren (2009) builds upon the insights of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), where the ex post renego-
tiation of agency contracts undermines the ex ante incentives. See also Spier (1997).
17There, doctors can improve the quality of care by investing in their human capital ex ante. Ex post,
patients have an incentive to waive tort liability, not taking into account the negative impact their actions
will have on the doctor’s ex ante incentives. Arlen (2010) argues that further market failures stem from
collective action problems and adverse selection.
18Priest (1981) describes informally how consumer heterogeneity may lead to ineﬃciencies, as the premium
charged to consumers would reflect the average risk to consumers rather than the consumer-specific risk. He
also describes how manufactures will oﬀer less-than-full warranties in this setting to combat the consumer
adverse selection problem. Id. at 1317. He concludes, however, that judicial expansion to warranty or
tort liability will make matters worse instead of better. Id. at 1349—1351. Intervention may be desirable
when consumers misperceive risks (Priest, 1981; Schwartz, 1988) or when risks are diﬃcult for consumers to
foresee (Kessler, 1943). See also Priest (1991).
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the “market for lemons” problem when sellers have superior information about the quality
of their products (Akerlof, 1970), allowing sellers of high quality products to credibly signal
their types (Grossman, 1983). Second, warranties can be an optimal contractual response to
producer moral hazard. The warranty eﬀectively creates a “performance bond,” generating
incentives for the manufacturer to make investments in product quality and safety (Priest,
1981; Cooper and Ross, 1985; Dybvig and Lutz, 1993).19 Interestingly, product warranties
may also be oﬀered by manufactures when the quality of the product is fully observable at
the time of sale. Manufacturers may bundle warranties with the sale of the products when
consumers are risk averse and the market for third-party insurance is thin (Brown, 1974;
Heal, 1977). Moreover, product warranties can be used as a price-discrimination device to
screen among heterogeneous consumers (Kubo, 1986; Padmanabhan, 1995; Matthews and
Moore, 1987).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the general setup and timing of the
model. Section 3 establishes a benchmark where the social planner can design the contracts
oﬀered on the market, but the firms remain free to choose their precautions and consumers
are free to choose whether or not to purchase the product. Section 4 characterizes the
competitive equilibrium and shows that the social optimum is not obtained. Competitive
firms oﬀer less than full warranties and correspondingly suboptimal product safety features.
Section 5 considers the public policy response to this problem. The social planner, who has
control over the liability policy, can increase welfare by mandating higher levels of warranty
coverage. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Setup
There is a unit mass of consumers, indexed by the preference type ˜ ∈ {  }, with
1      0. We will often refer to type  as the high-risk type, and  as the
low-risk type. The probability that any given consumer is of type  is  ∈ (0 1) and the
probability that she is of type  is 1 − . Let  ≡  + (1 − ). Each consumer
derives a gross valuation of  from using the product and, in case there is an accident, she
will suﬀer a harm of .20 The probability that the product will cause an accident depends
on both consumer’s type (the propensity for accidents) and the amount of unobservable
precaution taken by the manufacturer. More specifically, the probability of an accident
for a consumer of type  is given by ( ) =  − , where  ∈ [0 ) stands for the
amount of unobservable eﬀort or precaution taken by the manufacturer for each purchasing
19Product warranties will typically be less than full if there is a consumer moral hazard problem. See Lutz
and Padmanabhan (1995) for consumer moral hazard in an insurance model, and Lutz and Padmanabhan
(1998) for a two-sided moral hazard model.
20The size of the harm  can be either fixed or in expectation, so that the actual harm may vary among
consumers. Either assumption will produce the same substantive results. Also,  can contain both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary, e.g., pain and suﬀering, elements.
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consumer.21 The manufacturer’s unit cost of production is assumed to be () where
0(0) = 0, 0()  0, 00() ≥ 0 and lim→ () = ∞. We normalize the fixed costs of
production to be zero.
Each manufacturer can oﬀer a contract () where  stands for the price of the product
and  is the warranty or stipulated damages that the manufacturer will pay to the consumer
in the event that the consumer suﬀers harm of . When a consumer of type  chooses ()
in which the manufacturer has exerted a precaution of , the consumer’s (expected) utility
is  − − ( )(−) and the manufacturer’s (expected) profit is − ()− ( ).22
If the consumer does not purchase any product, we assume that she realizes zero utility
(her reservation value). We will consider two possible market structures for producers:
monopoly production with a single firm and a competitive market with free entry.
The timing of the game is as follows. At time  = 1, consumers privately learn their
types. At time  = 2, firms simultaneously oﬀer contracts () and choose their precaution
levels .23 Although the firms do not observe the consumers’ types directly, they oﬀer
contracts with expectations of which type(s) of consumers the contracts will later attract.
At time  = 3, each consumer observes all contracts that are oﬀered in the market, and
chooses which firm to purchase from (if any). If a consumer decides to make a purchase,
she pays the price  as specified in the contract. Consumers do not observe the firms’
precautions, but they make an inference based on the contract, in particular the warranty,
oﬀered. At time  = 4, purchasing consumers derive a gross utility of  and accidents occur
with probability ( ). When an accident occurs, warranty payments () are made by
the firms to the consumers who have suﬀered harm.
3 A Social Welfare Benchmark
Social welfare depends on two factors: the level of precautions taken by the firms and
the type(s) of consumers that purchase the products. Conditional on type  consumer
21Because the amount of precaution () taken by the manufacturer is not observable, imposing a liability
regime that conditions recovery on a negligence principle, i.e., when  falls below some threshold , is not
feasible. If the manufacturer’s precaution is observable by court without any error, the first best can be
achieved either through contract (which stipulates ∗ as a contractual obligation) or through mandatory
imposition of the negligence standard that sets the standard at ∗. Manufacturer’s liability will be discon-
tinuous at ∗. If precaution can be observed only with error, on the other hand, even with the negligence
standard, manufacturer’s liability will no longer be discontinuous and much of the analysis in this paper will
carry over.
22We have assumed, for the ease of exposition, that the consumers’ gross valuations () are identical
across types, but this can be relaxed. Even if the gross valuations were diﬀerent ( 6= ), so long as
 −  ≥  − , the low-risk consumers remain the more “eﬃcient” type (i.e., type with a higher
surplus), and the main results, that (1) unregulated market will produce under-deterrence and (2) mandating
a higher level of (perhaps full) warranty can induce a better equilibrium, will remain unchanged.
23By letting the manufacturers oﬀer contracts and choose the precaution levels simultaneously, we eliminate
the potential commitment and signaling problems.
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purchasing the product, the precaution level  should be chosen to maximize the social
surplus associated with that consumer type,
 − ( − )− ().
This produces the first-order condition of
0() = .
Due to additive separability on the probability of accident, the socially optimal level of
precaution is independent of the consumer type (). Let ∗ denote the first-best level.
More generally, with the assumptions on , the first-order condition of 0() =  produces
an implicit function of () where 0()  0 and () = ∗  0.
With the firms choosing the first-best level of precaution (∗), the social surplus as-
sociated with a consumer of type  using the product is  − ( − ∗) − (∗). It is
socially eﬃcient for a consumer to purchase the product when   ( − ∗)+ (∗) We
will consider two cases. In case 1,  ≥ ( − ∗) + (∗)  ( − ∗) + (∗) and it is
socially eﬃcient for both types of consumer to be served. In case 2, on the other hand,
( − ∗) + (∗)    ( − ∗) + (∗), so it is socially eﬃcient for only the low-risk
consumers to be served.24
Suppose that the social planner can dictate both the price and the warranty terms of
the manufacturers’ contracts. The social planner cannot directly control the consumers’
purchase decisions, the manufacturers’ precaution levels, or the decision of the manufactur-
ers whether to participate in the market. The following proposition establishes that the
social planner can implement the first-best market outcome through the proper choice of 
and .
Proposition 1 When it is eﬃcient to serve both types of consumer with the optimal pre-
caution (case 1), the social optimum is implemented with  ∈ [( − ∗) + (∗) ] and
 = . Both types of consumer purchase the product, and the manufacturers take optimal
precautions ∗ and earn non-negative profits. When it is eﬃcient to serve only the low type
of consumer with the optimal precaution (case 2), the social optimum is implemented with
 =  and  = . The low-risk consumers purchase the product and the high-risk con-
sumers do not, and the manufacturers take optimal precautions ∗ and earn strictly positive
profits.
By forcing the manufacturers to oﬀer a full warranty ( = ), the social planner gives
the manufacturers the incentive to choose the first-best level of precaution (∗). Since
24There is a third case where   (−∗)+ (∗) and it is socially eﬃcient for neither type of consumer
to purchase the product. This case is uninteresting, because there will never exist an equilibrium where the
product is actually sold.
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consumers are fully indemnified against accident losses, they strictly prefer to purchase the
product whenever    and are indiﬀerent about purchasing it when  = . Setting
 ∈ [(−∗)+(∗) ] implements the first-best outcome in case 1 because both consumer
types are willing to purchase the product and the firms at least break even. In case 2,
since  = , both consumer types are indiﬀerent between purchasing the product and not
purchasing it. It is therefore an equilibrium for the low-risk consumers to purchase the
product and the high-risk consumers to forego it, as required for social optimality in case
2.
Note that the first-best outcome for case 2 can be implemented arbitrarily closely in
dominant strategies by carefully choosing a warranty slightly below  and a corresponding
price slightly below . These values must be chosen so that the low-risk consumers strictly
prefer to purchase the product and the high-risk consumers strictly prefer to forego it.
Formally, let (∆) = −∆ and (∆) =  −∆(− ((∆))) where ((∆)) is the implicit
solution to 0(((∆))) = (∆).25 Note that (∆)  ∗ and approaches ∗ in the limit as
∆ approaches zero, and (∆)   and approaches  in the limit as ∆ approaches zero. A
consumer of type  will strictly prefer to purchase the product when
 − [ − ((∆))][− (∆)]− (∆)  0.
Substituting for (∆) and (∆) and rearranging terms, this becomes   . This is clearly
satisfied when  =  but not when  =  .
It bears emphasizing that, in case 2, social optimality requires that both consumer types
to be indiﬀerent between purchasing and not purchasing the product ( = ), or at least
that the price to be arbitrarily close to the consumers’ gross valuation. The consumer
surplus is (arbitrarily close to) zero in this case, and the manufacturers are earning all the
rents from the transaction. In other words, maximizing social welfare is not necessarily
consistent with the manufacturers earning zero profits.
Finally, in the current section, we have assumed that the social planner, while unable
to dictate the level of precaution, can control both the price and the warranty terms in
contracts. As a matter of comparison, when we analyze optimal social policy in subsequent
sections, we will assume that the social planner can control only the warranty aspect of
contracts by, for instance, either allowing or disallowing contractual waivers or requiring
firms to oﬀer a particular level of warranty.
25The expression for (∆) has a straightforward interpretation. It is the expected reduction in future
compensation for the “average” consumer of type  when the warranty falls from  to  − ∆. ∆ is
the reduction in the level of the warranty, and ( − ((∆))) is the probabilty of an accident. Thus,
∆(−((∆))) is the expected reduction in future compensation for the “average” consumer of type  when
the warranty falls from  to −∆.
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4 The Unregulated Market Outcome
Suppose that many firms compete for customers by oﬀering price-warranty combinations in
an unregulated environment. Assume also that there is no cost of entering the market.26
Consumers observe all contracts that are oﬀered in the market before choosing from whom
to buy (if at all). Although consumers do not directly observe the level of precautions
chosen by the firms at the time of sale, they do make rational inferences based on the
oﬀered contract. Similarly, firms choose the precaution level and the contract based on the
type(s) of consumers they expect to attract. In equilibrium, both the consumers’ and the
firms’ beliefs will be consistent with the actions taken by the other.
As a matter of comparison, suppose consumer types are observed by the firms and that
the firms can discriminate in the contracts oﬀered to the diﬀerent types of consumers. In
case 1, where both types of consumer should be served, the full-information equilibrium will
be given by
( ) = (( − ∗)+ (∗) ) ∀
That is, all firms will oﬀer full warranties,  = , choose the optimal level of precaution,  =
∗, and oﬀer type-dependent prices that allow them to just break even,  = (−∗)+(∗).
Note that the high-risk consumers pay a higher price than the low-risk consumers in this
full-information setting since it is more costly for firms to provide full insurance to the
high-risk types. In case 2, where only the low-risk consumers should purchase the product,
the competitive firms will oﬀer ( ) = ((− ∗)+ (∗) ) to the low-risk consumers
only. The high-risk consumers will not be given any meaningful option to purchase the
product. When firms can observe consumer types, under perfect competition, both the
social welfare and consumer surplus are maximized.
When firms cannot observe the consumer types, however, the full-information outcome is
not sustainable. In case 1, with full warranty, both types of consumer would strictly prefer
the contract intended for the low-risk consumers because it is cheaper:  = ( − ∗)+
(∗)   = ( − ∗)+ (∗). Similarly, in case 2, firms would not be able to prevent
the high-risk consumers from purchasing the product at the contractual terms intended for
low-risk consumers, Both consumer types would realize a strictly positive surplus of −.
When the high-risk consumers purchase the product at price , however, the firms will
make a loss.27
26We assume perfect competition with free entry for the sake of convenience. Even if entry is (pro-
hibitively) costly, so long as there is a large number of firms (  1) competing in the market by oﬀering
( ) contracts to consumers, all the competitive equilibrium results will carry over.
27We have also analyzed the equilibrium under an alternate set of assumptions of (1) consumers being
able to observe firms’ choice of precaution while (2) firms being unable to observe consumer type. Under
those assumptions, although firms will choose the optimal level of precaution, no warranty will be oﬀered
due to adverse selection. On the other hand, a monopolist will oﬀer full warranty–to extract consumer
surplus and choose the optimal level of precaution.
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It is also fairly straightforward to show that a competitive pooling equilibrium, under
which all firms oﬀer a single contract that serves both types of consumer, cannot exist.
For such an equilibrium to exist and allow the firms to break even, firms would have to
set price equal to the average cost of providing the warranty. With a price equal to the
average cost, the low-risk consumers would be paying too much for full insurance while the
high-risk consumers would be paying too little: low-risk consumers would be subsidizing
the high-risk consumers. Once the firms recognized this, they would have an incentive to
cream-skim the low-risk consumers, i.e., deviate from the pooling equilibrium, by oﬀering a
contract with less insurance but at a (substantially) lower price, and would make a strictly
positive profit. Put diﬀerently, low-risk consumers would have an incentive to signal their
types to the market by seeking a contract with a lower price and lower warranty. The
following lemma states this result more formally.
Lemma 1 There does not exist a competitive equilibrium where all firms pool and oﬀer a
single contract (0 0) that serves both types of consumer.
Proof. Suppose there exists a pooling equilibrium in which all firms oﬀer (0 0)
and both types of consumer purchase the product. The level of precaution, 0 would be
implicitly defined by 0(0) = 0. Given free entry, in that equilibrium, we must have
firms making zero profit, i.e., 0 = ( − 0)0 + (0). Since both types of consumer must
be willing to purchase the product at this price, the equilibrium contract must also satisfy
0 ≤  − ( − 0)(−0).
Suppose 0  0 ≤ . Consider a contract (1 1) such that 1 = 0 −  and 1 =
0 − ( − 0)((0) − (1)) − ( − (1)). 1 is constructed to reflect the marginal
reduction in expected value for the “average” consumer of type  stemming from the lower
warranty (since the warranty has fallen by ). Note that that 1 is strictly smaller than 0
and approaches 0 in the limit as  approaches zero. A consumer of type  will strictly
prefer (1 1) to (0 0) when − [− (1)][−1]− 1  − [− (0)][−0]− 0
Substituting for (1 1), we find that this inequality is satisfied if and only if   
Therefore, the low-risk consumers will strictly prefer (1 1) while the high-risk consumers
will strictly prefer (0 0). Because (− 1)1+ (1)  (− 0)0+ (0), the deviating
firm will make a strictly positive profit by selling to the low risk consumers only.
Now suppose that there is a pooling equilibrium where 0 = 0. In this scenario, the
eﬀort level would equal zero so the price would be 0 = (0). Since both types of consumer
purchase the product, it must be the case that  −    −  ≥ (0) (Note that it is
socially eﬃcient for both types of consumer to be served, even with zero eﬀort). We will
show that a profitable deviation exists that attracts only the high-risk types. Consider a
contract (2 2) such that 2 =  and 2 = (0) + (2) + ( − (2)) Note that
2 reflects the increase in the expected utility of the high-risk consumer who receives the
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warranty 2 =  and rationally expects the firm’s eﬀort level to rise from 0 to (2). The
high-risk consumers will weakly prefer (2 2) to (0 0) while the low-types will strictly
prefer (0 0). The expected profit from this deviation is 2 − ( − (2))2 − ((2))
or after substituting for 2 and 2, ()− ((())− (0)) This is strictly positive when
 is small, since 0(0) = 0 by assumption. Since this deviation would be profitable, the
pooling equilibrium (0 0) cannot exist.
If a competitive equilibrium does exist, therefore, it must be a separating kind. In case
1, in which both types of consumer should be served, a separating equilibrium would involve
two diﬀerent contracts, (  ) and ( ), where the low-risk consumers choose one
contract and the high-risk consumers select the other. In case 2, where the high-risk con-
sumers should not purchase the product, there will be a single equilibrium contract (0 0)
that serves the low-risk consumers only while the high-risk consumers would (weakly) prefer
not purchasing at all. To characterize these separating competitive equilibria in detail, we
examine the two cases separately.
4.1 Case 1: Both Types of Consumer Should Purchase the Product
Suppose  ≥ ( − ∗)+ (∗)  ( − ∗)+ (∗), so that it is socially eﬃcient for both
types of consumer to be served by the market with full warranty and precaution level ∗.
We have already established that a pooling equilibrium does not exist. Suppose there is a
competitive, separating equilibrium in which high-risk consumers choose (  ), low-risk
consumers choose ( ), and firms choose precaution levels in accordance, 0() = .
The separating equilibrium must solve the following program:28

() ( − ( − )(−)− ) + (1− )( − ( − )(− )− )
subject to
0() = 
 − ( − ) − () ≥ 0
 − ( − ())(−)−  ≥  − ( − ())(−)− 
The second set of constraints are the non-negative profit conditions for the firms. The
third set are the incentive compatibility conditions for the two types of consumers: each
consumer type should (at least weakly) prefer to choose the contract intended for his or her
type.29
28 Implicit in this setup is the condition that the perfectly competitive equilibrium will maximize the
consumer surplus subject to firms at least breaking even. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Besanko
and Thakor (1987). The program is also equivalent to consumers making a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer (and
signaling their types) to firms.
29The solution also has to make sure that the consumers would be willing to choose respective ( ),
rather than not buy, but this is easily satisfied when firms make zero profit in equilibrium.
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Proposition 2 Suppose it is socially eﬃcient to serve both types of consumer with the
optimal level of precaution (case 1). In a competitive Nash equilibrium, if it exists, firms
oﬀer a full warranty to the high-risk consumers,  = , but a less-than-full warranty to
the low-risk consumers,   . Firms break even by setting prices equal to the expected
cost of serving each type,  = ( − ∗)+ (∗) and  = ( − ()) + (()).
Proof. In a separating equilibrium, firms should make zero profits with respect to
both types of consumer:  − ( − ()) − (()) = 0 ∀. Suppose not. Given
free entry, when there is a positive profit margin with respect to any type of consumer,
firms that are serving that type of consumer will be infinitesimally small. First, suppose
− (− ())− (())  0 ∀. Let  ≡ min{ − ( − ()) − (()) −
(−())−(())}. Suppose a firm were to oﬀer (−2 ) and (−2 ).
Then the firm will be able to attract both types of consumer while satisfying the incentive
compatibility conditions and realize a strictly positive profit.
Second, suppose  − ( − ()) − (())  0 but  − ( − ()) −
(()) = 0. Let  ≡  − ( − ()) − (()). If a firm were to oﬀer
( − 2 ), it will attract all the high-type consumers and make a strictly positive
profit. It may also attract low-type consumers, but, if that were so, the firm’s profit
margin will be even larger since ( − ())+ (())  ( − ())− (()) ∀  0.
Finally, suppose  − ( − ()) − (()) = 0 but  − ( − ()) −
(())  0. Choose ( )  0 such that  − ( − ())( − ) −  =  − ( −
(−))(− (−))− (−) and −− (−(−))(−)−((−))  0.
That is, lower  by  and  by  such that the high-type consumers are indiﬀerent between
( ) and (− −), while marginally reducing the profit margin. The assumption
that  − ( − ()) − (())  0 implies that such a ( ) exists. If a firm were
to oﬀer (−  − ), the firm will attract all the low-type consumers (and no high-type
consumers) and make a strictly positive profit. The condition,  ( − ( − ())( −))   ( − ( − ())(−)), ensures that the low-type consumers will strictly prefer
( −   − ) to ( ), while the high-type consumers will (weakly) prefer (  )
to ( −  − ).
It is also straightforward to verify that the incentive-compatibility condition for the
high-type should bind but that for the low-type should be satisfied with slack:  − ( −
())(−)− = − ( −())(−)− but − (−())(−)− 
 − ( − ())( − ) −  . First, note that the conditions  − ( − ()) −
(()) = 0 and  − ( − ())(−)−  ≥  − ( − ())(−)−  imply
that    . Now, suppose the high-type’s incentive compatibility condition is satisfied
with slack:  − ( − ())(− )−    − ( − ())(− )− . Consider
increasing  by  and  by  so that  − ( − ())(−)−  =  − ( − ( +
))(−− )− − . Since  (− (− ())(−))   ((− ())+ (()))
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whenever   , ( + )− ( − ( + ))( + )− (( + )) ≡   0. By oﬀering
( +  − 2  + ), therefore, the firm will attract all low-type consumers and make
a strictly positive profit. Hence, the incentive compatibility condition for the high-type
consumers must bind in equilibrium.
With respect to the low-type’s incentive compatibility constraint, the fact that   
and the assumption that  (− ( − ())(−))   (− (− ())(−)) ∀  
imply that − (− ())(−)− {− ( − ())(−)}  − (− ())(−
)−{− ( − ())(−)}. That is, the utility gap between the high and the low-
type consumers is larger with  than with  . From the binding incentive compatibility
condition for the high-type, if we add  − ( − ())(− )−  to the left hand side
of the inequality and  − ( − ())(−)−  to the right hand side, and simplify,
we get  − ( − ())(− )−    − ( − ())(− )−  .
When the zero-profit conditions are used to simplify the objective function and the
binding incentive-compatibility condition is simplified, the problem becomes
 ( − ( − ())− (())) + (1− )( − ( − ())− (())
subject to
(()− ())+ ( − ) + (())− (()) = 0
The Lagrangian is
L(w ) = ( − ( − ())− (())) + (1− )( − ( − ())− (())
− {(()− ())+ ( − ) + (())− (())}
The first-order conditions are
0()( + )(− ) = 0
0(){(1− )(− )− (− + ( − )0())} = 0
(()− ())+ ( − ) + (())− (()) = 0
Since the Lagrange multiplier   0 in equilibrium, the first equality can be satisfied only
by setting  = . From the second equation (or the third equation), if we were to
set  = , the left hand side will be strictly negative (or strictly positive), violating
optimality. To satisfy the equality, we need   . The corresponding prices are
given by the firms’ binding zero-profit constraints:  = ( − ())+ (()) and  =
( − ()) + (()).
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the proposed equilibrium for Case 1. The two steeper
curves depict the high-risk and low-risk consumers’ gross utilities as a function of the war-
ranty . (For ease of illustration, the curves have been drawn as straight lines.30) Note
30The slope of consumer type ’s valuation is (−())+0()(−) and the slope of the cost of serving
type  is ( − ()). Since 0()  0, (1) the slope is decreasing for all the curves and (2) the slope of the
consumer valuation curve is always higher than that of the corresponding cost curve (except when  = ).
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that the gross utilities are increasing in the warranty coverage and that the low-risk con-
sumer has a higher gross utility than the high-risk consumer (except when  = ). The
two flatter lines depict the firms’ costs of serving the two diﬀerent consumer types. Note
that the cost of serving a high-risk consumers is higher than the cost of serving a low-risk
consumers (except when  = 0). For the high-risk consumers, the full warranty with
 = (−())+(()) is oﬀered in equilibrium, and these consumers realize a positive
surplus, graphically represented as . The warranty for the low-risk consumers () is
chosen so that the high-risk consumers are just indiﬀerent between choosing  =  and
 (or weakly prefers choosing ). With  = ( − ()) + (()) and , the
low-risk consumers earn a surplus, graphically represented as .
If the competitive market were to oﬀer contract(s) with full warranty ( = ) to both
types of consumer, given (1) free entry and (2) that all consumers will strictly prefer a
contract with lower price, the market must charge a price equal to the average cost of
serving both types ( = ( − ∗) + (∗)). If that were the case, however, firms would
have an incentive to oﬀer a contract with less-than-full insurance just to lure the low-risk
consumers and make a strictly positive profit (as described in the proof of Lemma 1). In
a separating equilibrium, therefore, the less-than-full insurance for the low-risk consumers
( ) must be just so that the high-risk consumers would be indiﬀerent between the two
contracts oﬀered in the market (or slightly prefer the one intended for them). From the
diagram, this warranty is given by the point where the diﬀerence between the high-risk
consumer’s utility and the cost of providing  to them is equal to . If a firm were oﬀer
any warranty below this, that contract will be strictly dominated. Conversely, if any firm
were to oﬀer any warranty higher than this, that firm will attract both types of consumer,
resulting in a negative profit.31
Although the last proposition characterizes a competitive Nash equilibrium, it does not
ensure its existence. Due to the adverse selection problem, existence is not guaranteed.
In the proposed separating equilibrium, each type of consumer realizes a certain amount of
consumer surplus. If the average cost of serving both types is suﬃciently low, however, a
firm can oﬀer a single contract that attracts both types of consumer and make a strictly
positive profit. At the same time, we know from the previous lemma that such a pooling
outcome cannot be an equilibrium, either. To ensure existence, we need to make sure that
the average cost of serving both types of consumer is not too low. The following corollary
presents the conditions under which the proposed competitive separating equilibrium exists.
Corollary 1 If (− ())+ (()) ≥ −  where  ≡ − (− ())(−)− {(−
())+ (())}, there is no profitable deviation, and the separating Nash equilibrium
exists.
31This statement is subject to the caveat that the average cost of serving both types is not too low, which
is discussed in detail in the following paragraph.
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Proof. Since  (− (− ())− (()))  0, if a firm were to deviate by oﬀering a
pooling contract, the maximal deviation can be achieved by oﬀering full warranty. Hence,
to prevent deviation, we need to ensure that oﬀering full warranty is not profitable. 
stands for the surplus the low-risk consumers realize in the separating equilibrium. If (−
())+(())  −, by oﬀering  =  and  such that −    (−())+(()),
the deviating firm can attract both types of consumer and make a strictly positive profit.
Hence, (−())+(()) ≥ − is a suﬃcient condition for the existence of the proposed
separating Nash equilibrium.
To understand this corollary more intuitively, let us go back to Figure 1. In the proposed
separating equilibrium, the low-risk consumers’ surplus is given by , the diﬀerence between
their gross utility from having a contractual warranty  and the market price in this
contract, . In order to prevent any firm from deviating from this equilibrium, we need
to make sure that the most profitable (maximal) deviation is prevented, which happens
when a firm were to oﬀer full warranty ( = ). Could a firm oﬀer full warranty, attract
both types of consumer, and make a strictly positive profit? That depends on the average
cost of providing full warranty and serving both types. If the average cost were to fall
below  − , then by oﬀering  =  with price anywhere between  −  and the average
cost (( − ()) + (())), the firm will make a strictly positive profit and attract both
types of consumer. With full insurance, both types of consumer are willing to pay up to
. Since the price is below  − , both types of consumer will strictly prefer this pooling
contract to the proposed separating contracts. Hence, when the average cost is suﬃciently
low, even the separating equilibrium will not exist. And, from Lemma 1, we also know
that the pooling equilibrium cannot exist, either.
In sum, when it is socially eﬃcient to serve both types of consumer with the socially
optimal level of precaution (case 1), then there are two possible outcomes. First, when the
average cost of serving both types of consumer is above a threshold ((−())+(()) 
 − ), then a competitive separating equilibrium exists. In this separating equilibrium,
firms oﬀer low-risk consumers a less-than-full warranty in order to induce self-selection by
the low-risk types. The less-than-full warranty, in turn, translates to suboptimal level of
precaution (  ∗). Second, when the average cost of serving both types of consumer is
below the threshold (( − ())+ (())   − ), it is possible that there is a complete
break-down of the market, in the sense that no competitive Nash equilibrium exists.32
This is true even though consumers all place a higher value on the product than the cost
of production with full warranty.
4.2 Case 2: Only Low-Risk Consumers Should Purchase the Product
Suppose ( − ∗)+ (∗)   ≥ (− ∗)+ (∗). Unlike the previous case, now it is no
longer eﬃcient to serve the high-risk consumers. The assumption ( − ∗)+ (∗)  
32 If we were to impose a stronger equilibrium concept, the existence problem could be solved. The
equilibrium will still be ineﬃcient, however. See Wilson (1977).
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implies that the social surplus from serving the high-risk consumers is negative regardless
of the size of the warranty. The first best is to serve only the low-risk consumers with a full
warranty ( = ) and for the firms to choose the eﬃcient level of precaution ( = ∗) for
them. The first best cannot be achieved in a competitive equilibrium, however, because,
with a full warranty, both types of consumer have a willingness-to-pay that is equal to , and
when firms price the product at less than , they cannot prevent the high-risk consumers
from also purchasing the product. In order to prevent the high-risk consumers from also
participating in the market, the equilibrium warranty for the low-risk consumers has to be
less than full.33
Suppose there is a competitive, separating equilibrium where all firms oﬀer (0 0),
only the low-risk consumers purchase, and firms choose the level of precaution given by
0(0) = 0. The equilibrium must solve the following problem:

(00)
 − ( − 0)(−0)− 0
subject to
0(0) = 0
0 − ( − 0)0 − (0) ≥ 0
 − ( − 0)(−0)− 0 ≤ 0
The second constraint is the non-negative profit condition and the third represents the
incentive compatibility condition for the high-risk consumers, saying that the high-risk
consumers do not find it in their interest to purchase the product.34
Proposition 3 Suppose it is socially eﬃcient to serve only the low-risk consumers with
the optimal level of precaution (case 2). In a competitive Nash equilibrium, if it exists, all
firms oﬀer a contract with a less-than-full warranty, 0  , only the low-risk consumers
purchase, and firms break even, 0 = ( − (0))0 + ((0)).
Proof. Based on Lemma 1, we cannot have an equilibrium where all firms set  = ,
since that would only induce a pooling equilibrium. Therefore, we must have 0  .
In equilibrium, both constraints, 0 − ( − 0)0 − (0) ≥ 0 and  − ( − (0))( −
0) − 0 ≤ 0 must bind. Suppose not. First, suppose 0 − ( − 0)0 − (0)  0 and
− ( − (0))(−0)− 0 = 0. Because the profit margin is strictly positive, with free
entry, each firm will be infinitesimally small. Since (−())+0()(−)  (−())
whenever   , ∃ ( )  0 such that 0 − ( − (0 − ))(0 − ) − ((0 − )) ≥ 0
33 If the price were equal to , consumers would all be indiﬀerent between purchasing and not purchasing,
and firms would get all of the rents. Per Lemma 1, this cannot be an equilibrium, either.
34The solution also has to make sure that the low-risk consumers would be willing to purchase (0 0)
but this is easily satisfied when firms make zero profit in equilibrium.
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and  − ( − (0 − ))( − (0 − )) − (0 − ) = 0. If a firm were to deviate and
oﬀer (0−  0− 2), the firm will attract all the low-type consumers and make a strictly
positive profit.
Second, suppose 0 − ( − 0)0 − (0) = 0 and  − ( − (0))( − 0) − 0  0.
Again, since ( − ()) + 0()(− )  ( − ()) whenever   , ∃ ( )  0 such
that 0 − ( − (0 + ))(0 + )− ((0 + )) = 0 and  − ( − (0 + ))(− (0 +
)) − (0 + ) ≤ 0. At (0 +  0 + ), the low-type consumers are enjoying a surplus
of  − ( − (0 + ))( − (0 + )) − (0 + )   − ( − (0))( − 0) − 0. Let
the diﬀerence be . If a firm were to oﬀer (0 +  0 +  + 2), it will attract all the
low-type consumers and make a strictly positive profit. If both constraints are satisfied
with slack, a profitable deviation can be constructed using either of the approaches. If
both were satisfied with slack, a firm can profitably deviate through a combination of both
maneuvers. In equilibrium, therefore, both constraints must bind.
The binding constraints produce the optimal solution (0 0). Since ( − ()) +
(())  −(−())(−) ∀,   (−())+(()), and (−())+(()) =
( − ()) + (()) when  = 0, it is clear that the solution that satisfies both
0 − ( − 0)0 − (0) = 0 and  − ( − (0))( − 0) − 0 = 0 exists and also that
0  .
Figure 2 graphically presents the proposed equilibrium. Unlike the previous case, now
the cost of insuring the high-risk consumers lies everywhere above their willingness-to-pay.
If the competitive market were to oﬀer a full warranty (which will be along the vertical
dotted line at ), both types of consumer have a willingness-to-pay that is equal to ,
making it impossible to distinguish them as the social optimality requires. In a separating
equilibrium where (1) only the low-risk consumers are served and (2) firms break even, the
warranty has to be set at a level where the high-risk consumers are just indiﬀerent between
purchasing and not purchasing. This contract is given by the point where the high-risk
consumers’ utility crosses the cost of providing warranty to the low-risk consumers. At
(0 0), the high-risk consumers, even if they were to buy, would realize a utility of zero.
The low-risk consumers, on the other hand, are realizing a surplus equal to .
While the proposed equilibrium is intuitively attractive, similar to the previous case,
its existence (or stability) is not guaranteed. Even though it is ineﬃcient to serve the
high-risk consumers, if the average cost of serving both types of consumer is suﬃciently
low, a firm may profitably deviate by oﬀering a pooling contract that serves both types.
Combining this low average cost condition with Lemma 1, in turn, implies that there would
be no competitive Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, the existence is, compared to the
previous case, a bit easier since, by assumption, the cost of serving the high-risk consumers is
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ineﬃciently high. The following corollary establishes the conditions under which profitable
deviation using a pooling contract is not feasible.
Corollary 2 If ( − ∗) + (∗) ≥  −  where  ≡  − ( − (0))( − 0) − {( −
(0))0 + ((0))}, there is no profitable deviation and the separating Nash equilibrium
exists.
Proof. The proof is similar to that in case 1. Since  (−(−())−(()))  0, if
a firm were to deviate by oﬀering a pooling contract, the maximal deviation can be achieved
by oﬀering full warranty. Hence, to prevent deviation, we need to ensure that oﬀering full
warranty is not profitable.  stands for the surplus the low-risk consumers realize in the
separating equilibrium. If ( − ∗) + (∗)   − , by oﬀering  =  and  such that
 −     ( − ∗) + (∗), the deviating firm can attract both types of consumer and
make a strictly positive profit. Hence, (− ∗)+ (∗) ≥ − is a suﬃcient condition for
the existence of the proposed separating Nash equilibrium.
The corollary can be more intuitively explained through Figure 2. In the proposed
separating equilibrium (0 0), the low-risk consumers earn a surplus of . If a firm were
to maximally deviate from this equilibrium and oﬀer a full warranty, it will attract both
types of consumer. If the average cost of serving both types of consumer with full warranty
(( − ∗) + (∗)), falls anywhere below  −  (lies below  −  on the vertical dotted
line through ), firms will have a profitable deviation. By charging a price, say b, that is
between the average cost ((−∗)+(∗)) and −, it will attract both types of consumer
and make a strictly positive profit. The high-risk consumers will enjoy a strictly positive
utility of  − b. The low-risk consumers will also strictly prefer this contract (b ) since
their surplus will be larger than . To prevent this deviation, the average cost of providing
full warranty has to lie above  − . With that, if any firm were to deviate and oﬀer full
warranty, it will only attract high-risk consumers and realize a loss.
5 Public Policy Implications
This section characterizes the optimal public policy response to the adverse selection prob-
lem identified in the previous section. We will assume that the social planner can dictate
the warranty terms of the sales contracts, , but cannot directly control the market price,
. In contrast to the benchmark case where the social planner controlled the price in addi-
tion to the warranty, the first-best outcome cannot always be achieved here. We will see,
however, that the warranty is a valuable instrument for raising the levels of product safety
in the market.
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5.1 Case 1: Both Types of Consumer Should Purchase the Product
Suppose  ≥ ( − ∗)+ (∗)  ( − ∗)+ (∗), so that it is socially eﬃcient for both
types of consumer to be served by the market with full warranty and precaution level ∗.
Recall that perfect competition led to either (1) low-risk consumers purchasing products
with less-than-full warranties and suboptimal safety attributes (and high-risk consumers
purchasing optimally safe products) or (2) a complete break-down of the market. In either
case, the socially optimal policy is relatively straightforward to derive.
Proposition 4 Suppose it is socially eﬃcient to serve both types of consumer with the
optimal level of precaution (case 1). The optimal social policy is to require all firms to oﬀer
a full warranty,  = . Firms subsequently choose optimal precautions,  = ∗, charge a
price that allows them to break even on average,  = (− ∗)+ (∗), and sell to both types
of consumer.35
By mandating a full warranty or, equivalently, by allowing consumers to recover for
the harm suﬀered notwithstanding any prior contractual limitation, the social planner can
implement the first-best outcome. The crux of the problem with the unregulated market
was that the firms had an incentive to cream-skim only the low-risk consumers with a
contract specifying a less-than-full warranty. Mandating a full warranty solves the problem
because it prevents firms from ineﬃciently undercutting each other. Since the willingness-
to-pay for full insurance for both types of consumer is higher than the average cost of
providing full insurance, with a mandatory full warranty and perfect competition, firms
will charge the price that is equal to the average cost of serving both types, both types of
consumer will purchase, and firms will choose the optimal level of precaution. Both the
social welfare and the consumer surplus are maximized.36
5.2 Case 2: Only Low-Risk Consumers Should Purchase the Product
Now suppose (−∗)+(∗)   ≥ (−∗)+(∗), so that only the low-risk consumers
should purchase the product. Constructing the optimal social policy is more challenging
in this case. Simply requiring all firms to oﬀer full warranty ( = ), as in case 1, may
not work. Because both types of consumers are willing to pay up to  for the product with
full warranty, mandating full warranty will lead to either (1) a destruction of the market in
which no consumers are served when the average cost of serving both types lies above , or
35The proof is immediate. Note that since    = ( − ∗)+ (∗), when liability is full, both types of
consumers will purchase the product.
36 If (()− ())+ (()) ≥ − , the low-risk consumers will be worse oﬀ compared to the separating
equilibrium: their surplus is strictly less than . The fact that the low-risk consumers are subsidizing the
high-risk ones creates an incentive for them to signal their type to the market (by taking on less-than-full
warranty). Although the signaling is in their private interest, it creates a welfare loss. See Aghion and
Hermalin (1990) for a similar story.
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(2) both types of consumer purchasing the product when the average cost falls below . In
the former case, ineﬃciency stems from the low-risk consumers being unable to purchase the
product, whereas in the latter, from the high-risk consumers participating in the market.
Proposition 5 Suppose it is socially eﬃcient to serve only the low-risk consumers with
the optimal level of precaution (case 2). When ( − ∗) + (∗) ≥ , an equilibrium
that is arbitrarily close to the first best can be implemented in dominant strategies through
the policy of mandating (∆) =  − ∆ with ∆ → 0. When ( − ∗) + (∗)  ,
the optimal policy is to either mandate (1) a warranty that is implicitly determined by
( − ()) + (()) =  − ( − ())(− ) or (2) a full warranty ( = ).
Proof. Suppose ( − ∗) + (∗) ≥  and the policy mandates (∆) =  − ∆ with
∆ → 0. Under that policy, firms will choose precautions ((∆)) and competition will
drive the price down to −(−((∆)))∆. Only the low-risk consumers will purchase at
this price. Because (− ((∆)))∆+ (((∆)))  − ( − ((∆)))∆ whenever ∆  0,
no firm can profitably deviate by setting a price strictly below  − ( − ((∆)))∆. and
attracting both types of consumer. If a firm were to do so, it would make a strictly negative
profit. Although the equilibrium profit margin, −{−((∆)))(−∆)+(((∆)))}, is
strictly positive, since, by assumption, the cost of entry is zero, firms will be infinitesimally
small.
When ( − ∗) + (∗)  , we need to consider two sub-cases. First, if the policy
were to mandate a warranty (0) such that 0 → , because the average cost lies below the
high-risk consumers’ valuation, i.e., ( − (0))0 + ((0))   − ( − (0))( − 0),
all firms will set 0 = ( − (0))0 + ((0)), make zero profit, and serve both types of
consumer. The equilibrium social welfare is given by  − ( − (0)) − ((0)). Since
the welfare is maximized by setting 0 = , if the policy were to choose any warranty level
so as to serve both types of consumer, it should mandate full warranty. Firms will break
even (zero profit margin) by charging 0 = ( − ∗)+ (∗).
Second, the policy could mandate a warranty that is given by ( − ()) + (()) =
 − ( − ())( − ). Let that warranty be denoted 00. The equilibrium price is
00 = −(−(00))(−00). Since (−∗)+(∗)   and (−(0))0+((0))  −
(−(0))(−0), we must have 0  00   and only the low-risk consumers purchasing,
thereby improving welfare. While each firm’s profit margin, 00−{−(00))00+((00))},
will be strictly positive, firms will be infinitesimally small given free entry. No firm can
profitably deviate because if it were to oﬀer any price strictly below 00, it will attract both
types of consumer and will make a strictly negative profit. Pricing above 00 is also (weakly)
dominated.
The optimal policy depends on the relative size of the deadweight loss in both cases
and their comparison to the competitive outcome (0 0). In the unregulated competitive
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equilibrium (0 0), assuming its existence, the ineﬃciency stemmed from incomplete war-
ranty for the low-risk consumers: (1− ){[∗− (∗)]− [(0)− ((0))]}  0. Under
the first policy option, the welfare loss comes from the high-risk consumers’ purchase of the
product: (( − ∗)+ (∗)− )  0. As the fraction of high-risk consumers () grows
larger, the ineﬃciency under the first policy gets larger while that under the unregulated
competitive equilibrium gets smaller. When the fraction of high-risk consumers is large
(but not large enough to satisfy ( − ∗) + (∗)  ), mandating full warranty may be
welfare reducing. In the second case, the welfare loss stems from incomplete warranty for
the low-risk consumers: (1− ){[∗− (∗)]− [(00)− ((00))]}  0. Unlike the first
policy option, the second policy strictly dominates the unregulated competitive equilibrium
(0 0) in terms of welfare, since 00  0 so long as   1.
When the average cost of providing full warranty to both types is suﬃciently high
((−∗)+(∗) ≥  and represented as the higher dotted diagonal line in Figure 3), we can
implement a market outcome that is arbitrarily close to the first best by requiring a warranty
level that is slightly below the full level. The argument is similar to the one presented as the
social welfare benchmark in section 3. When the social planner mandates a warranty level
that is below the full level (represented as 0 in Figure 3), in equilibrium, firms will oﬀer a
price (represented as 0 in Figure 3) that is equal to (or slightly higher than) the high-risk
consumer’s valuation (− ( −(0))(−0)) and serve only the low-risk consumers. If a
firm were to deviate and charge a lower price (  0), it will attract both types of consumer
and incur a loss since, by assumption, the cost of serving both types lies above 0. Charging
a higher price (  0) is also strictly dominated because no one will choose that contract.
Given that the equilibrium price (0) lies between the low-risk consumers’ willingness-to-pay
and the firms’ cost of serving them (−(−(0))(−0)  0  (−(0))0+((0))),
both the low-risk consumers and the firms will realize a positive surplus.
To maximize social welfare, the social planner should mandate a warranty that is as
close to the full level as possible. As the mandated warranty approaches the full level
(0 → ), a couple of things will happen. First, the equilibrium price will approach
the consumers’ gross valuation with full warranty (0 → ), and the low-risk consumers’
surplus will disappear in the limit. From Figure 3, this can be seen by observing that
as 0 approaches , 0 will crawl along the line that represents the high-risk consumers’
willingness-to-pay and approach , thus eliminating the low-risk consumers’ surplus. At
the same time, the size of the deterrence ineﬃciency will get smaller (0 → ∗) as the
firms take more safety precautions with larger warranty. Finally, although all the surplus
( − ( − ∗) − (∗)) will be captured by the firms in the limit, with free entry, each
firm will be infinitesimally small. In sum, when the average cost of serving both types of
consumer is suﬃciently high, by mandating a warranty that is slightly below the full level,
the social planner can implement an equilibrium that is arbitrarily close to the first best.
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Figure 3: Optimal Social Policy when ( − ∗)+ (∗)   ≥ ( − ∗)+ (∗)
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When the cost of serving both types is suﬃciently low (( − ∗) + (∗)   and
represented as the lower dotted diagonal line in Figure 3), keeping the high-risk consumers
out of the market in a competitive equilibrium becomes more of a challenge. The reason
is that whenever the mandated warranty gets close to the full level, because the average
cost of serving both types will lie below both types’ valuations, firms, in equilibrium, will
have an incentive to oﬀer a contract that attracts both types. To see this, from Figure
3, whenever   00, under perfect competition, all firms will oﬀer contract with price
equal to the average cost of serving both types ( = ( − ()) + (())) and attract
both types of consumer. Attempting to serve only the low-risk consumers by charging a
price above the high-type’s valuation ( ≥  − ( − ())( − )) is strictly dominated
since even the low-risk consumers will choose the contract with the lower price. When
( − ∗) + (∗)  , therefore, the social planner can either (1) require firms to full
warranty and allow both types of consumer to participate in the market or (2) mandate
less-than-full warranty, suﬃciently unattractive to the high-risk consumers, so that the firms
will serve only the low-risk consumers.
If the full warranty were mandated, in a competitive market, firms will charge a price
equal to the average cost ( = ( − ∗)+ (∗)), serve both types of consumer, and break
even. Some transactional ineﬃciency will result from high-risk consumers participating in
the market. Firms, however, will choose the optimal level of precaution ( = ∗): deterrence
eﬃciency is achieved. When compared to the unregulated competitive equilibrium (0 0),
assuming its existence, the full warranty policy, unfortunately, does not guarantee welfare
improvement. When firms were serving only the low-risk consumers but with incomplete
warranty (0  ), the ineﬃciency resulted from suboptimal deterrence (0  ∗). When
the fraction of high-risk consumers () gets larger, the transactional ineﬃciency from serving
them also grows. In contrast, the deterrence ineﬃciency in the unregulated competitive
market gets smaller since there aren’t as many low-risk consumers. The more high-risk
consumers there are, therefore, the less attractive mandating full warranty becomes, making
it uncertain whether the full warranty policy will improve upon the unregulated competitive
outcome.
If the social planner were to keep the high-risk consumers out of the market, she must
make sure that (1) the high-risk consumers find it unattractive to purchase the product and
(2) firms will not have an incentive to deviate and serve both types of consumer. This is
done by equating the cost of serving both types ((− ())+ (())) with the high-risk
consumers’ valuation ( − ( − ())( − )), which is represented as 00 in Figure 3.
With 00, firms will oﬀer a price that is equal to (or slightly above) the high-risk consumers’
valuation (00 = − ( − (00))(−00)) and keep the high-risk consumers out. If a firm
were to unilaterally deviate and price the product below 00, it will attract both types of
consumer and make a negative profit. Pricing above 00 is also dominated since the firm
will not be able to attract any consumers. Note that this is the best the social planner
can do while keeping the high-risk consumers out. If she were to mandate a warranty level
that exceeds 00, because the average cost now falls below both types’ valuations, firms
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will serve both types of consumer at average cost. With (00 00), each firm will enjoy a
strictly positive profit margin but, due to free entry, will be infinitesimally small. Unlike the
full warranty option, this policy strictly dominates the unregulated competitive equilibrium
because firms are only serving the low-risk consumers but are spending more (while still at
a suboptimal level) on safety precautions (0  00  ∗).
6 Conclusion
One of the important objectives of the products liability law is to create incentives for
manufacturers to make cost-justified investments in product safety. Currently, the law
attempts to achieve this objective by allowing harmed consumers to fully recover from
the manufacturers and by prohibiting them from contractually waiving products liability.
Such a rigid, mandatory imposition of liability has received much criticism. When the law
allows consumers and manufacturers to privately stipulate almost every other aspect of the
transaction, why not also allow them to choose their own liability regime, so long as they do
so voluntarily and in an informed manner? The proponents of the “consumer sovereignty
norm” have argued that the market-based system will not only function at a lower cost
(especially when the current system is perceived to be so costly) but also better tailor to
consumers’ heterogeneous preferences over safety and liability. Firms will provide more
extensive warranty, and correspondingly safer product, to those that are more prone to
suﬀer harm (or more risk-averse), while for the others who are less likely to suﬀer harm (or
less risk-averse), the market will oﬀer products with less extensive warranty and a smaller
number of safety attributes.
This paper has argued that when the market is subject to the problems of adverse se-
lection, it will provide suboptimal safety incentive to firms. It is precisely the consumer
heterogeneity (over propensity to suﬀer harm or risk-aversion) that causes the adverse se-
lection and market failure. When firms cannot identify consumer type, in equilibrium,
they will oﬀer low-risk consumers products with suboptimal warranty and safety attributes.
When the adverse selection problem is severe, the market may even completely fall apart,
even though the consumers value the products more than the cost of producing them. To
increase social welfare, the paper has argued that the social planner should consider either
(1) requiring all firms to oﬀer a full warranty, for instance, by prohibiting consumers from
waiving products liability, or (2) mandating a warranty level that is less-than-full but pro-
vides better deterrence incentive to firms while keeping the very high-risk consumers from
purchasing the product. In addition to providing better deterrence incentives to firms, the
policy can also restore a market equilibrium when the adverse selection problem led to a
complete market break-down.
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